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The Essential Elements of a Functioning Democracy
IV. THE Jett:
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A FUNCTIONING DEMOCRACY

Dennis C. Jett*

My remarks today will deal with the elements that are essential to a
functioning democracy; and how during my time in Peru from 1996-1999,
I came to appreciate this even more than before. For a democracy worthy
of the name, you have to have a legislature and a judiciary that are each
capable of being a counterweight to the potential abuse of power by the
executive branch. You have to have media that is free to inform the public
and can give them the information they need to be responsible citizens.
You also need civil society that has a full range of non-governmental
organizations, representing all the causes out there, from human rights to
whatever endangered species there are. They also play their part in the way
government reaches its decisions on policy. And if you do not have those
elements, or they are seriously compromised, as they were in Peru, then
you cannot really say you have a functioning democracy. So if the
institutions are failing, so will the democracy.
Again, going back to my Peruvian experience, there were electoral
officials, but they were, as you have seen on the videos, bought by Mr.
Fujimori and Mr. Montesinos. There were judges, but they were preselected for the cases the executive branch cared about to ensure the right
verdict was reached.
The legislature in Peru was 120 congressmen elected nationwide by
party. They have just moved to a district system for some of the seats in
Peru, but it is still a selection by the party. And so, there is no direct
election or direct accountability of individual legislators to the voter. In
fact, they only recently began to record some of the votes on particular
pieces of legislation. So you would have a legislator, who had no record
of voting that the public could verify to see where that person stood on the
issues.
In addition, the staff of each legislator consisted, almost always of six
people. There would be a secretary, a chauffeur, a bodyguard, presumably
to protect them from the voters, a driver, an errand boy, and somebody
called an assistant, who probably could have been the research and
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administrative arm, but usually turned out to be somebody's nephew who
needed a job.
So the legislators were basically incapable of playing their role as a
Congress, in the sense of providing a check and balance on the role of the
executive branch, providing any constituent service or even drafting or
analyzing bills to any great degree. In the end, a legislature constituted in
that fashion probably does more to undermine democracy than they did to
strengthen it because it was an institution, like the judiciary, in which
people had no confidence.
In addition, you need a free press. In Peru, the importance of the media
as a basic element of democracy was also demonstrated. Under Fujimori,
the bulk of the media was more than willing to attack that small portion of
the media that was trying to do its job. Again, like many judges and
congressmen the newspapers were co-opted by the executive branch.
The television stations, if they broadcast openly, in the sense of
transmission via the airways and not via cable, were bought off, coerced
or co-opted. Peru did have a fairly extensive range of civil society
organizations, but again, it was under a certain amount of stress.
Human rights activists used to get so many death threats that it had
almost become a matter of routine. They would pick up the phone, and
they would say: "Oh, hi, how are you doing? Okay, you are going to kill
me again. All right. Talk to you again next week."
Peru today is very different from what it was under Fujimori and where
it could have been but for one event. It is about to have an election that
will freely and fairly choose between the two remaining candidates, but
that democratic revival hung on a thin thread. And that thread is one video,
which the cable news network aired, showing Montesinos bribing a
Congressman. When people actually had to confront the fact that
Congressmen were being bribed, that brought down the whole house of
cards and both Fujimori and Montesinos eventually had to flee the country.
Everybody suspected there was corruption; and many certainly believed
it, but the reaction when people were able to actually see it shows the
power of the media and the power of one video.
Any Peruvian who bothered to read the press that was trying to do its
job of reporting the facts would have suspected there was corruption and
that democracy was in peril. Certainly as early as early 1998, three things
were apparent to anyone who was paying attention: First, it was clear
Fujimori was going to run for a third term in the year 2000, because he
was obsessed with staying in power and arrogant enough to think he was
the only one who could run the country. Second, it was likely that he
would win, because the opposition would remain divided and Fujimori
would do anything necessary to win. Third, either democracy or Fujimori
was not going to survive for the full five years of his third term, from
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol14/iss1/4
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2000-2005. My guess was that democracy was going to be the victim, not
Fujimori.
I was wrong on the last count; I am happy to say, but when I discussed
these three points with business groups, they essentially shrugged it off
and said, "All we want is stability." They did not, and may still not, realize
that stability comes from strong institutions, not strong individuals. Unless
countries like Peru do a better job of building those institutions and
making them capable of resisting the temptation on the part of strong
individuals to abuse the power, then you are never going to have stability
or democracy.
So I am encouraged by what is happening in Peru, and I think it is
headed in the right direction. But progress is never linear; it is always a
couple steps sideways, a few backward, and then some forwards.
Columbia is obviously in a different situation with narco-terrorists in
control of much of the country. In Venezuela, Hugo Chavez looks more
and more like a modem day Mussolini, except the trains do not run on
time.
Despite some weak spots, I am glad to say that we have a hemisphere
where, at least to some degree, in some form, all the countries are
democratic. That is except for the Cuban anachronism, a situation that at
a minimum biology will resolve sooner or later. This democratic
foundation gives the Americas a tremendous advantage in terms of our
ability to compete politically and economically with the rest of the world.
And, I am encouraged by the trade summits; and I am encouraged by
conferences like this, which, I think will go a long way towards building
economic and political linkages and making sure we all can advance
together.
With that, I would like to conclude. Thank you for your attention and
I am willing to take any questions you have.
QUESTION:

In terms of judicial training - in the early '90s the U.S. government
was interested in judicial training in the East, sort of institution building
in the East. I do not know if you had anything to do with that at all, but do
you have any idea why that stopped? Really, it seems that it would have
been a very important training to have continued.
DENNIS C. JETT:

I do not know anything about that particular case. But, I can guess that
what happened was that the government commitment to that training was
not genuine. We had a similar situation in Peru with a national
magistrate's council. We supported that particular institution and helped
it to begin to function and to do its job, which was to select, train, and
supervise judges.
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2001
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In the end, Fujimori decided that an independent judiciary was not
convenient or was not conducive to his political plans; and so, he
essentially gutted the institution. At his instruction, the legislature passed
a law taking away all of the council's meaningful powers. The magistrates
that were on the council all resigned in mass, but the government quickly
came up with seven replacements that were only too eager to do the
government's bidding. So for international assistance to be effective, you
really need not just the training, but you need the commitment of the
people at the top. And obviously, sometimes that commitment wavers.
I wrote a piece back in May for the Christian Science Monitor, which
said basically that the next president of Peru will have to surrender some
power to keep his power. By that, I meant he has to support the
strengthening of the institutions so that the public can have some
confidence in those institutions. Otherwise, the next president of Peru will
eventually become tainted with the specter of corruption. Even if the
President is personally of the highest integrity, there will be people in his
government who are not; and accusations will be made. You need strong
institutions that can play those roles that I described. But, if you do not
have the commitment of the man at the top, then providing training is
pointless. Donor countries will eventually realize that and then go out and
look to do something else. Sometimes it is building things at the grass
roots or operating through non-governmental organizations to get around
the failings or unwillingness of the government. Donor countries will
switch their support to different programs sometimes because they want
to do things that are effective with the aid that they are giving to a
particular country.
QUESTION:

Being in Peru you had a chance to - and sir, I do not know if you were
in Peru when the OAS came down to reverse the measures that Fujimori
took. And, the Quebec Summit yesterday included a provision in the
Declaration that would require that all participants in the hemispheric
integration process be democratic, and if there is a break in that, then there
must be collective action basically. And, I am wondering if you think it is
likely that it will work?
DENNIS C. JETT:

Thanks for that question. Basically, I am skeptical. There has been a
resolution on the books for the OAS that they will consider an interruption
in democracy as a threat to regional stability. And they will, under certain
circumstances. They are not now obligated to do anything, even when they
are supposed to look at the situation. Perhaps the main problem today is
that the OAS is not very good at reaching judgments when it is a situation
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol14/iss1/4
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short of a military coup. If you have a military coup, as often happened in
the past, clearly you have had an interruption of democracy.
In Peru it was more a slow motion auto-golpe, because Fujimori was
destroying the institutions that could resist his third term, but doing so
methodically by undermining and not simply overthrowing the institutions
of democracy. So, in getting somebody to make that determination
requires deciding at what point a democracy no longer is a democracy
even though the president is elected. In those cases, which are going to be
the case today, the OAS will probably never get around to making that
determination.
That said, it is still helpful that the OAS proclaims this as a goal and
pays some attention to it. I think it will be helpful, but whether it will be
effective, I am not so sure. In Peru's case, the OAS did help significantly
with its election observers. In no small part, this was because Eduardo
Stein, a former foreign minister in Guatemala, was the head of the election
observation mission. If the average OAS bureaucrat had led it, he not
wanting to make waves might have come out with judgments saying, for
example, "Oh, this election isn't so bad."
But Stein said, "I'm not going to hang around and observe what is
essentially a farce." So he pulled the observers out and thus signaled to all
within and outside Peru that the elections stood no chance of being free
and fair. Rarely will you have a bureaucrat of that courage. Rarely will you
have an organization made up of member governments that is willing to,
in these gray situations, say that one of their members has created a
situation that is so dark gray that it is effectively black. The normal
reaction of a multilateral organization like the OAS would be just to fill
the air with diplomatic smoke.
QUESTION:

Mr. Ambassador, I am concerned with your comment about the law of
biology with reference to Mr. Castro. Having watched him since 1957 as
a student reading Herbert Matthews' articles, I have been determined to
outlast him. But, I am afraid that the law of biology applies to all of us. I
wonder if you would take your former government position and unbiased
observation, and turn it to Cuba where we have such anachronisms. To be
sure, Cuba has the largest diplomatic mission of any country. There, we
have a billion dollars net transfer from Cuban exiles into the country, very
substantial tourism, and illegal, yet very substantial trade, which goes
through third party nations. Given an opportunity to advise the president
of Cuba, what would you tell him?
DENNIS C. JETT:

I doubt anyone running Cuba would listen to my advice, but I would
ask him if retirement is in his career plans. I think my general advice
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2001
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would be - and obviously Cuba is an issue with a lot of emotional
attachment - that Cuba prepare for the transition to its next leader. I
would suggest the same advice to an American president to act
constructively so that it is a smooth transition, and in the process do not do
anything that harms U.S. interests. For example, the Helms-Burton Act, I
think, is essentially counterproductive. It is counterproductive, because it
complicates our relationship with third countries and does not really
advance the transition process in Cuba.
QUESTION:

Mr. Ambassador, there is an interesting trend in South America. Some
of the economies are becoming dollarized. What do you think about that,
specifically in relation to the 2005 Trade Agreement?
DENNIS C. JETT:

That is a good question. On dollarization, people suggested that to me
in Peru that their country should be dollarized and they pointed to the
European Community and the European Union. My response was, "Yes,
but that took an army of bureaucrats twenty years to implement in
countries with only a modest degree of variation in development and a
certain common level of economic achievement."
It is looked at as an easy solution; in that, if you cannot deal with your
economic situation, then dollarization might solve everything. Perhaps that
is because two of the most abused powers of a sovereign country are its
ability to have an army and the ability to print their own currency. When
you have irresponsible leadership they can just print money to pay for
whatever it is they want to buy, and then they have their military around
to suppress people and keep them in line. With a dollarized economy, you
take away the ability to print money, and so you instill some fiscal
discipline, which is useful. On the other hand, it also removes a
government's discretion for taking certain actions, which may or may not
be a good thing in the end.
To the extent that economies are dollarized, it advances the process of
hemispheric integration as foreseen in the trade agreement you mentioned.
That is not to say that dollarization does not have its down side. For
example, counterfeiting U.S. currency is a growth industry in Colombia.
By and large, dollarization would probably have a positive effect, but
the question that remains is how do you harmonize economies that are
very different? And certainly, it is not a simple solution. Not as simple as
the proponents of it would portray.
QUESTION:

Ambassador, when you speak of democracy - generally when people
speak of democracy - they speak of U.S. style democracy. Is it fair to
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol14/iss1/4
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suggest that because of some of the historic and socio-economic
differences between the United States and some of our South American
neighbors, that perhaps U.S. style democracy is not the most well suited
governmental system for those countries?
DENNIS C. JETT:

The short answer is no. You get the cultural argument a lot, whether it
is Asia, Latin America, or Africa. Your kind of democracy would not work
here for whatever reason and then fill in the blanks. It has to do with
history, culture, level of development, etc.
I simply do not buy that argument. I am not suggesting that everybody
has to have exactly the same system as the United States. But, basically
you need institutions; you need a media that prints the truth or at least
information so that people can make judgments.
That is why this new world information order that was promoted by
UNESCO a number of years back made no sense. It assumed that people
in some countries were not capable of dealing with real information, so
they had to have a layer of bureaucrats predigest it for them.
People have to be able to express their views. They have to hear the
views of others. They have to have democratic institutions that work, such
as a judicial system capable of justice, a media capable of reporting
information, and a legislature capable of restraining the abuses of the
executive branch. Those are fundamental elements that apply in any
situation, in our country or in any country. And the cultural argument, as
I said, I simply do not buy.
When I was in Peru, I commented in a speech that Peru had just bought
MIG-29s and that the Peruvian people did not know how many MIG-29s
were bought or how much was paid for them. I explained that it seemed to
me that in a democracy you have a debate about guns versus butter, about
spending on social programs versus military programs, and that if a MIG29 costs ten million dollars for instance, that you could construct four
hundred rural classrooms for ten million dollars. And so I asked, where is
the threat? Is it an internal threat due to frustration, lack of education, lack
of opportunity, or lack ofjobs; or is it an external threat, an invasion from
abroad that is best met with a MIG-29?
The next day, a number of young men with closely cropped hair were
busily painting the freeway overpasses with things like, "United States get
your traitor dog ambassador out of our country," or "Ambassador Jett, go
home," etc. It has since come out that the kickbacks on the purchase of
those MIG-29s amounted to a couple hundred million dollars that went
into the pockets of the generals involved, including fourteen million
dollars into the head of the army's account in Switzerland.
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So, I think unless you have those kinds of debates and allow the media
to report them, then you are left with the old cliche that happens to be true,
"Power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely."
It will invariably happen and that is why we have to have democratic
institutions to work to prevent that from happening. I think that is true in
any country.
Thank you very much.
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